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“FEEDBACK LOOP”: THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 AND ITS 
PROGENY 
DREW S. DAYS, III* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is truly an honor and pleasure to join you in commemorating the fortieth 
anniversary of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1  This legislation 
has brought broad, positive change and progress to American society.  
Although testimonials are notoriously unreliable and consequently viewed with 
some suspicion in academic circles, I want, nevertheless, to testify to the 
pervasiveness I witnessed, as a black child growing up in the South during the 
1940s and early 1950s, of a state-imposed and state-enforced system of 
segregation and discrimination. It was a system that denied the humanity of 
millions of American citizens on the basis of race.  I can remember “off-limits 
signs,” in fact or in practice, that deprived me, my family, and friends of equal 
access to places of public accommodation.  I remember the segregated schools 
I attended where my mother was employed as a teacher.  I can recount the 
employers who refused to consider African-Americans for anything more than 
the most menial of jobs, despite their educational background and experience. 
In contrast, I want to testify to the changes that I saw after 1964 as the 
United States Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights in the Carter 
Administration, a position where I was responsible for federal civil rights 
enforcement nationwide.  Congress’s passage of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965,2 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,3 the Fair Housing 
Act of 1968,4 the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX),5 and the Age 
Discrimination Act of 19756 were clearly having a profound effect.  This 
legislation, designed in significant part to complement and reinforce the 
provisions of the 1964 Act, created opportunities for millions of people 
previously blocked in their quest for the “American Dream” by discrimination 
 
* Alfred M. Rankin Professor of Law, Yale University. 
 1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
 2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973p (2000). 
 3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2000). 
 4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2000). 
 5. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000). 
 6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101–6107 (2000). 
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on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, and age.  The 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (§ 504)7 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
19908 extended the benefits of federal protection to the disabled, a group 
generally marginalized in American society and its economic mainstream.  
Both practices and attitudes toward questions of discrimination were being 
affected for the good by individual and public enforcement, as well as by 
voluntary changes in private-sector practices.  Market forces, shaped by the 
civil rights laws, have also played a part in this societal transformation.9  
Clearly, vestiges of that earlier time remain with us.  New examples of racial 
or other forms of bigotry can be found across the land; problems that the civil 
rights statutes were meant to address have not vanished.10  Large numbers of 
our citizens are jobless11 and are without access to basic health care.12  Many 
live in substandard housing13 and are educated in segregated schools that lack 
the basic tools to prepare the next generation to assume productive roles in our 
society.14 Those of us who expected the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and later civil 
rights legislation to be the cure for all ills of inequality that beset our nation 
have since learned that there is only so much weight “one boat,” or fleet of 
boats for that matter, can effectively carry. 
 
 7. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). 
 8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000). 
 9. A recent reflection of the positive role of the private sector was the amicus brief filed by 
major corporations urging the Supreme Court to uphold affirmative action admissions programs 
in higher education.  See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae General Motors Corp., Gratz v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516); Brief of Amicus Curiae General Motors Corp., Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241).  Supporting amicus briefs were also filed on behalf 
of, inter alia, 65 Lending American Businesses and Exxon Mobil.  Justice O’Connor’s opinion 
for the Court in Grutter referenced these briefs for the proposition that “skills needed in today’s 
increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse 
people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. 
 10. For example, African-Americans still encounter racial discrimination in places of public 
accommodations such as restaurants.  See, e.g., United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights 
Division, Case Summaries: United States v. Flagstar Corp. & Denny’s, at  http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
crt/housing/documents/casesummary.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2005) (reporting on the consent 
decree in which Denny’s paid $45 million in damages and implemented a nationwide program to 
prevent future discrimination). 
 11. As of December 2004, approximately eight million people, or 5.4%, were unemployed.  
United States Department of Labor, The Employment Situation, at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/ 
news.release/History/empsit.01072005.news (Dec. 2004). 
 12. In 2003, there were forty-five million Americans without health insurance.  U.S. Census 
Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2003, 14 (2004), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p60-226.pdf (Aug. 2004). 
 13. Nat’l Law Income Housing Coalition, America’s Neighbors: The Affordable Housing 
Crisis and the People it Affects, 1 (2004), available at http://www.nlihc.org/ research/ 
neighbors.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2004). 
 14. See Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King’s Dream or Plessy’s Nightmare?, 
at  http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg04/resegregation04.php (Jan. 2004). 
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Now that my testimonial is out of the way, let me now turn to the 1964 Act 
itself. 
Two civil rights cases, of particular significance as we commemorate the 
fortieth anniversary of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, are on the 2004-2005 docket 
of the United States Supreme Court.  One raises the question of whether a 
person claiming to be a victim of retaliation for protesting discriminatory acts 
by a recipient of federal financial assistance has a private right of action to 
redress his injury.15  In the second case, the Court is asked to resolve a split 
among the federal courts of appeals over the issue of whether disparate impact 
claims may be brought for alleged employment discrimination.16  If this picture 
strikes you as somewhat odd, there is a reason.  Forty years ago Congress 
included in the 1964 Act a provision known as Title VI, which prohibits 
“discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance” against anyone “on [the] ground of race, color, or national 
origin.”17  Moreover, Title VII of the Act,18 which bars employment 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin has 
been construed, since the landmark 1971 Supreme Court decision in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Company,19 to permit disparate impact suits.  In such litigation, 
the plaintiff may recover for employment discrimination if the defendant 
utilizes a practice that disproportionately screens out members of a group 
protected by the Act and if the practice cannot be shown to be job related or 
consistent with business necessity, even though there is no evidence of an 
intent to discriminate.20  Congress codified this judicially created doctrine in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.21 
Hence, the logical question to be asked might be, “Why is the Supreme 
Court considering these seemingly well-settled issues decades after passage of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964?”  They are on the docket because the first case 
involving retaliation arises under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex “under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,”22 not Title VI, 
which does not include sex among its forbidden grounds.  The second case 
grew out of a lawsuit filed by police officers and other law-enforcement 
 
 15. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2002), rev’d, 125 S.Ct. 
1497 (2005) (holding that retaliation may be a form of intentional sex discrimination actionable 
under Title IX and gives rise to a private right of action). 
 16. Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003), aff’d, 125 S.Ct. 1536 (2005) 
(holding that the ADEA does authorize disparate impact claims). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). 
 18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17. 
 19. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 20. Id. at  431. 
 21. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
 22. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000). 
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personnel against their municipal department alleging violations prohibited by 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),23 not Title VII 
of the 1964 Act. 
Congress enacted both statutory schemes, Title IX and the ADEA, 
explicitly borrowing significant features of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, with 
appropriate changes, to reflect the fact that they were intended to address 
discrimination on grounds not included in the 1964 “model” provisions.  
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,24 the Age Discrimination Act of 
1975,25 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,26 similarly draw their 
substantive and procedural features significantly from the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  There are undoubtedly several reasons why Congress chose to draft the 
new statutes in this fashion.  It may have found, for example, some sense of 
security in adopting and altering, only slightly, provisions that had already 
received legislative blessing and favorable judicial interpretation.27 
I mention the two cases scheduled to be heard and decided during the 
Supreme Court’s upcoming term to underscore the central thesis of this article, 
namely that the future impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for good or ill, 
will be very much determined not only by the way in which the courts continue 
to construe the provisions of that law but also the statutes that were fashioned 
explicitly upon the 1964 Act, its “progeny,” in a manner of speaking.  It is a 
type of “feedback loop” that I believe is unprecedented in American law.  By 
“feedback loop,” borrowing liberally from applied physics, I mean a process 
within a system in which signals are sent out from the source that return to that 
source producing sometimes positive or negative effects and triggering yet a 
new cycle.28  What I hope to show is precisely how the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
and its progeny act and react with each other as the courts go about interpreting 
and applying their similarly constructed provisions.  One, however, has reason 
to ask on this occasion how effective has the 1964 Act been? 
 
 23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2000). 
 24. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). 
 25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101–6107 (2000). 
 26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000). 
 27. It might be explained by what economic theorists call “path dependence.”  See Oona A. 
Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common 
Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 606–22 (2001); Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path 
Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 251–67 (2000). 
 28. See Principia Cybernetica Web, Feedback, available at http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/ 
FEEDBACK.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2005); see also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 
495 (2d ed. 1991). 
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II.  EVALUATING THE 1964 ACT’S EFFECTIVENESS. 
The 1964 statute is composed of eleven separate titles,29 but only three of 
those have been the subject of any extended legislative, judicial, or academic 
focus over the intervening years.  Title VI (nondiscrimination in federally 
assisted programs)30 and Title VII (prohibiting employment discrimination) 
have already been described.31  The third, Title II, provides for injunctive relief 
against discrimination in places of public accommodations on the basis of race, 
color, religion, or national origin.32  Of these three titles, Title II, though one of 
the most controversial provisions in the bill during its long passage to 
enactment, has been viewed as probably the most effective and transformative 
in terms of its impact upon pre-Act public accommodation practices in the 
Deep South and Border States.  Scholars have offered various reasons why this 
has been so, one being that Title II “attacked a simpler and more vulnerable 
target than did other provisions” of the Act.33  Among other things, it 
addressed primarily a regional, not national problem; it attacked the most 
blatant forms of racism; it involved no redistribution of valuable opportunities 
previously enjoyed only by whites; and it provided a form of “cover” for white 
entrepreneurs in the South who were willing, but for the existence of Jim Crow 
laws and racist violence, to serve an integrated clientele for purely financial 
reasons.34  Another scholar observed that “[i]n attacking segregated stores, 
hotels, and restaurants, Title II ‘tore old Dixie down’ almost overnight.”35  In a 
similar vein, a 1971 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights report on the status of 
civil rights progress stated that Title II was one of the most dramatic examples 
of the weight a civil rights law can carry, noting that “thousands of hotels, 
motels, restaurants, and theaters” had abandoned their discriminatory 
policies.36  Among other factors was the speed with which the United States 
Department of Justice (DOJ) acted to enforce the provision.  “Within a few 
months after enactment, the Department . . . brought several enforcement 
actions which tested the constitutionality of the public accommodations law” 
and ensured that it was, and would remain, the law of the land.37  Finally, there 
were social factors.  Desegregation of places of public accommodation, as 
opposed to neighborhoods, was seen as less threatening to whites.  It was also 
more likely that those blacks able to take advantage of desegregation of public 
accommodations would come from a relatively small, middle-class group that 
would not create class, as well as, racial discomfort for whites.38 
 
 29. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (Title I (Voting 
Rights), Title II (Injunctive Relief Against Discrimination in Places of Public Accommodation), 
Title III (Desegregation of Public Facilities), Title IV (Public Education), Title V (Commission 
on Civil Rights), Title VI (Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs), Title VII (Equal 
Employment Opportunity), Title VIII (Registration and Voting Statistics), Title IX (Intervention 
and Procedure After Removal in Civil Rights Cases), and Title X (Establishment of Community 
Relations Service)).  For a selection of the voluminous literature on the legislative history of the 
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Most commentators have found the enforcement record with respect to 
Title VI rather mixed, except for a short period of vigorous enforcement when 
the Administration of President Lyndon Johnson pressed for faster school 
desegregation in the mid-1960s.39  Title VI was originally conceived as 
primarily an administrative rather than judicial technique for addressing 
discrimination under programs or activities receiving federal financial 
assistance.  The sanctions available for non-compliance were suspension, or 
ultimately, termination of federal funding.40  In reality, however, this provision 
was hedged about with various presidential and congressional restrictions upon 
the use of fund cutoffs, bureaucratic inertia, delays caused by funding agency 
referrals to the Department of Justice for court-enforcement, and, on occasions, 
intense political pressure to relax any tendency toward vigorous enforcement.41 
There was, however, another mode of enforcement not explicitly provided 
for in Title VI.  Approximately fifteen years after the Act’s passage, the 
Supreme Court adopted a position that had been broadly recognized in the case 
 
1964 Act, see generally BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: TEXT, 
ANALYSIS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: WHAT IT MEANS TO EMPLOYERS, BUSINESSMEN, UNIONS, 
EMPLOYEES, MINORITY GROUPS (1964); THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE 
LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997); David B. Filvaroff & 
Raymond E. Wolfinger, The Origin and Enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in LEGACIES 
OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000); HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972 (1990); 
CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985). 
 30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-7 (2000). 
 31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17. 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3. 
 33. Randall Kennedy, The Struggle for Racial Equality in Public Accommodations, in 
LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 156, 161 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000). 
 34. Id. at 160–62. 
 35. Hugh Davis Graham, The Civil Rights Act and the American Regulatory State, in 
LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 43, 48 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000). 
 36. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 92D CONGRESS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS 
ENFORCEMENT 10 (Comm. Print 1971). 
 37. Id. 
 38. HARRELL R. RODGERS, JR. & CHARLES S. BULLOCK, III, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE: 
CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 63 (1972). 
 39. See generally STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY 
OF TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1995); AUGUSTUS J. JONES, JR., LAW, 
BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICS: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
OF 1964 (1982); NORMAN C. AMAKER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 62–
64 (1988). 
 40. U.S. COMM’N. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT TO ENSURE 
NONDISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS 38 (Comm. Print 1996). 
 41. HALPERN, supra note 39, at 284–320. 
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law—namely, that there was an implied private right of action.42  At its best, 
then, Title VI afforded a three-pronged enforcement regime: administrative 
sanctions, DOJ litigation, and suits by private parties.43 
Title VII, the employment discrimination provision, was at the heart of 
intense debate in the Congress prior to passage.  On one side were those in 
favor of creating an administrative agency (what became the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)) with “cease and desist” 
powers akin to those possessed by the National Labor Relations Board.44 
Others, whose model was later inacted, took the position that the EEOC should 
have authority only to investigate and attempt conciliation of charges filed by 
individuals, this leaving enforcement to individual lawsuits or “pattern or 
practice” suits brought by the Attorney General.45  The 1972 amendments to 
Title VII extended coverage that had previously reached only private sector 
employees to those in the public sector and authorized the EEOC to bring suits 
against non-governmental employers.46  Enforcement of Title VII was 
hampered from the start by the fact that the Department of Justice was slow in 
initiating litigation47 and the EEOC was over-worked and under-funded, a 
condition that has plagued that agency’s effectiveness through the years.48  
Moreover, despite some exceptions in its history, the Commission has found 
itself unable to systematically address patterns and practices of employment 
discrimination, focusing instead on attempting to resolve individual 
complaints.49  In the late 1960s and early 1970s, nevertheless, the Department 
of Justice did win several important victories, and the Supreme Court took a 
rather sympathetic view of Title VII’s substance and purpose, most especially 
in its 1971 Griggs decision.  The subject of Title VII’s effectiveness has 
 
 42. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
 43. Note, After Sandoval: Judicial Challenges and Administrative Possibilities in Title VI 
Enforcement, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1774, 1776 (2003) (hereinafter After Sandoval). 
 44. Amaker, supra note 39, at 108. 
 45. See, e.g., David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal 
Employment Opportunity Law Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1135–36 (1989). 
 46. William A. Hazel, Title VII Does Not Preempt Section 1983 Actions by State Employees 
Alleging Employment Discrimination: Trigg v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 28 B.C. L. REV. 
140, 141 n.5 (1986). 
 47. Rose, supra note 45, at 1137–38 (1989). 
 48. See id. at 1135–36; see also U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL 
RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT—1977; TO ELIMINATE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: A 
SEQUEL 201 (1977); Michael Z. Green, Proposing a New Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement after 
35 Years: Outsourcing Charge Processing by Mandatory Mediation, 105 DICK. L. REV. 305, 
326–30 (2001); Maurice E.R. Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect, 13 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 219, 256 (1995). 
 49. See Munroe, supra note 48, at 256–60.  Title VII was amended in 1972 to grant the 
EEOC the right to sue in federal courts and to intervene in suits brought by private parties.  Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 105 (1972) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2000)). 
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spawned a large, contentious scholarly literature, both theoretical and 
empirical.  These views range from claims that Title VII was unnecessary 
because market forces would ultimately eradicate employment discrimination 
because it is economically inefficient,50 to assertions that it, in fact, reduces the 
employment prospects of members of the covered groups,51 to evidence that 
the provision had its greatest effect only during the first ten years after the Act 
was passed in attacking egregious forms of employment discrimination against 
blacks in the South.52 
III.  CONGRESS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE 1964 ACT. 
The ensuing forty years have also witnessed a tug of war between 
Congress and the Supreme Court over the nature and scope of enforcement 
mechanisms under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, providing, in part, an answer 
to yet another often-asked question: “Why does it take so long for civil rights 
laws to have any real impact?” 
By the end of the first decade after passage of the 1964 Act, lower federal 
courts had recognized the extent to which successful enforcement of the civil 
rights laws depended upon the combined efforts of government agencies, 
“private attorney[s] general,” individuals, and organizations willing and able to 
bring lawsuits seeking remedies for acts of discrimination.53  In 1975, 
however, the Supreme Court held that federal courts were not authorized to 
award attorney’s fees to litigants in civil cases without congressional 
authorization.54  Up until that point, courts in civil rights cases had developed a 
“common law” with respect to awarding such fees in appropriate cases.55  
Congress responded a year later by enacting legislation explicitly granting 
federal courts the discretion to award attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties in 
cases brought under a number of civil rights provisions, including Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972.56  It is here that one sees the earliest intertwining of provisions of the 
1964 and 1972 Acts in subsequent legislation.  Rules governing the award of 
attorneys’ fees were, thenceforth, applied equally to each of them. 
 
 50. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 37–38 (1992). 
 51. Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513, 
517–19 (1987). 
 52. John J. Donohue III & James Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The 
Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1603, 
1635–40 (1991). 
 53. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401–02 (1968). 
 54. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 267–71 (1975). 
 55. See, e.g., Bell v. Sch. Bd. of Powhatan County, 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963). 
 56. Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, Pub L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 
(1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000)). 
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Shortly thereafter, the Court recognized the existence of an implied private 
right of action under Title IX.57  Because Title IX was patterned by Congress 
after Title VI— except that the former provision prohibited sex discrimination 
only with respect to educational programs or activities receiving federal 
financial assistance—the Court held that Title VI also implicitly authorized 
private rights of action.58 
The next interaction among parallel provisions of 1964 Act and its progeny 
occurred in 1984.  In that year, the Supreme Court decided the Grove City 
College case.59  It presented the Court with two central questions having to do 
with the proper construction of the phrase in Title IX, “any education program 
or activity receiving federal financial assistance.”60  The first was whether the 
College, one that received no direct federal financial assistance, was, 
nevertheless, a “recipient” of such assistance because some of its students 
received federal grants and loans.  The Court held that it was a recipient.61  The 
second question was whether the College itself was the “program or activity,” 
requiring it to commit itself to non-discrimination on the “basis of sex” 
throughout the entire institution, or just in that part of its operation at issue in 
the case, its financial aid office.  On that point, the Court concluded that the 
entire college was not a “program or activity” under Title IX.62  This second 
holding had, according to one account, a “devastating impact” upon federal 
administrative enforcement of Title IX,63 as well as upon private suits,64 
particularly with respect to institutions of higher education.  As a theoretical 
matter, Grove City College could, thereafter, discriminate on the basis of sex in 
athletics or in physics classes because neither would fall within the category of 
a covered “program or activity.”  Because the term “program or activity 
receiving federal financial assistance,” in Title IX was drawn from Title VI and 
replicated in § 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act and the Age Discrimination 
Act of 1975, enforcement of all four funding statutes, not just Title IX, became 
subject to this “program specific” restriction.65  Congress’s response to the 
Grove City College decision was to enact the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 
1987,66 which, once again, made an entire institution subject to the four federal 
 
 57. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 715–17 (1979). 
 58. Id. at 694–96. 
 59. Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). 
 60. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000). 
 61. Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. at 569-71. 
 62. Id. at 570-74. 
 63. Robert M.  Hendrickson et al., The Impact of the Civil Rights Restoration Act on Higher 
Education, 60 EDUC. L. REP. 671, 673 (1990); see also S. REP. NO. 100-64 (1987), reprinted in 
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3. 
 64. See S. REP. NO. 100-64, at 10-11 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3. 
 65. See, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 635-36 (1984) (finding § 504 
enforcement limited by “program specific” requirement). 
 66. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). 
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funding statutes, “even if only one portion of the institution received federal 
funds.”67 
As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court’s 1971 Griggs decision 
represented a major advance in challenges under Title VII to segregated 
employment patterns, for it outlawed certain practices that, although not 
intentionally discriminatory, had disproportionately segregative effects without 
a sufficient business justification.68  Griggs served as controlling precedent in 
such litigation until the late 1980s when the Supreme Court handed down two 
major decisions that substantially undermined its fundamental premises and 
significantly increased the burdens plaintiffs had to carry in order to prevail in 
such lawsuits.69  There ensued several years of intense debate and controversy 
within Congress (and between Congress and the White House) over various 
proposals to enact legislation overturning these decisions, as well as others that 
cut back on favorable precedents construing related civil rights laws 
prohibiting employment discrimination.70  What ultimately emerged was the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which, for the first time, codified the Griggs 
precedent.71  The Act did far more than enshrine the Griggs standard.  Finding 
that “additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful 
harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace”72 Congress, for 
the first time, made available compensatory and punitive damages as remedies 
under Title VII.73  The Act also affords a right to a jury trial where damages 
are sought.74 
Two other comprehensive statutes also drew their inspiration from the 
1964 Civil Rights Act: the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(ADEA)75 and the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).76  Their 
reach is not limited to recipients of federal financial assistance. 
 
 67. See Hendrickson, supra note 63, at 671. 
 68. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
 69. See Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
 70. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 490 U.S. 164 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Lorance v. AT & T Tech’s, 
Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989).  See generally DAVID A. CATHCART ET AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
OF 1991 (1993); HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991: SPECIAL REPORT (1992). 
 71. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 10 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
 72. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 2. 
 73. Id. § 102(a)(1). 
 74. Id. § 102(c)(1). 
 75. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2000). 
 76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000); see also Oubre v. Energy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 
422, 426–27 (1998) (discussing Congress’s efforts to provide greater protection to older workers 
by enacting the Older Workers Benefits Protection Act of 1990). 
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A. Age Discrimination 
The ADEA protects workers who are at least forty years old against 
discrimination because of age.  It is generally patterned in both substantive and 
procedural terms after those found in Title VII.77  Consequently, it has been 
argued, but not yet resolved by the Supreme Court, that the ADEA authorizes 
bringing claims based upon the disparate impact test announced in Griggs as 
well as those alleging intentional discrimination.  Because the ADEA and Title 
VII are largely in pari materia, that conclusion should necessarily follow, it is 
contended.78  Counterarguments, however, point to features of the ADEA that 
sufficiently distinguish it from Title VII to undermine any claims that it 
authorizes disparate impact suits.79  But, perhaps most telling, the opponents of 
reading Griggs into the ADEA assert that when Congress codified the Griggs 
test in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it added no such parallel provision to the 
ADEA.80  Congress did make other amendments, however, to the ADEA.81  
The Supreme Court has agreed to hear, during the 2004-2005 term, a case 
raising this exact question: Are disparate impact claims cognizable under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act?  Without venturing to predict the 
outcome in this case, I would like to point out that whatever the Court decides, 
its opinion will very likely address issues that may affect general 
understandings with respect to Title VII, the ADEA, and the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991.82 
Despite their great similarities, another tension has arisen between the 
Supreme Court’s construction of Title VII and the ADEA.  The Supreme Court 
has, since the early days of Title VII, held that the prohibition against racial 
discrimination is designed to protect majorities as well as minorities, whites as 
well as blacks.83  Yet the Court only recently held in General Dynamics Land 
Systems, Inc. v. Cline84 that an employer and its union were free under the 
 
 77. See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995); Oscar 
Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979). 
 78. See Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 856 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 79. See Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 701–703 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 80. See Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1008 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 81. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 115, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991) (amending time 
period for filing). 
 82. Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003), aff’d, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).  
Shortly before publication, the Supreme Court held that the ADEA does encompass disparate 
impact claims.  It was clear, however, to note that impact liability under the ADEA is narrower 
than under Title VII.  Not only is liability limited by the former statutes “reasonable factor other 
than age” (RFOA) provision but also in light of Congress’s failure to include the ADEA in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 that codified the Griggs standard.  As a consequence, the Court held that 
disparate impact cases under the ADEA must meet pre-1991 Title VII standards established by 
the Wards Cove and Watson decisions.  See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 83. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971). 
 84. General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004). 
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ADEA to negotiate a contract where then-current employees fifty years or 
older at the date of the contract would still receive full health benefits, despite 
the elimination of the company’s obligation to provide such benefits to 
subsequently retired employees, but those under fifty would not.  The 
plaintiffs, those employees under fifty, were unsuccessful in arguing that 
because the ADEA was intended to prohibit younger employees from being 
favored over old ones, it should also preclude older employees from being 
favored over younger ones.85 
B. Disability 
In 1990, Congress enacted a comprehensive statute, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), that prohibits broadly discrimination on the basis of 
disability.  The ADA is not limited, as is Title 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, to addressing only discrimination committed by recipients of federal 
financial assistance.86  The ADA’s composition reflects Congress’s decision, 
once again, to incorporate in this new statute both substantive and procedural 
provisions from earlier legislation. 
The ADA’s prohibitions apply to employers, public entities, and places of 
public accommodation.87  Several critical definitions in the Act, such as who is 
“a person with a disability,” are drawn from § 7 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973.88  The employment title (Title I) borrows substantively, as well as with 
regard to its enforcement procedures and remedies, from Title VII.89  
Consistent with this effort was Congress’s decision, in the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, to extend the right of prevailing plaintiffs in ADA, along with Title VII, 
intentional discrimination cases to obtain compensatory and punitive 
damages.90 
The ADA’s title having to do with “public entities” (Title II) uses language 
almost identical to that in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.91  Although there is 
 
 85. Id. at 594–600. 
 86. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), (5), 12112(a) (2000) (prohibiting covered employers 
from discriminating); 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination in any place of public 
accommodation). 
 87. See 42 U.S.C §§ 12111(2), (5), 12112(a) (2000) (prohibitting employers from 
discriminating); 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2000) (prohibitting places of public accomodation from 
discriminating); 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (prohibitting public entities from discriminating).  Note 
additionally that, in 1988, Congress passed the Fair Housing Amendments Act, which, among 
other things, extended the Fair Housing Act’s protections against housing discrimination to the 
disabled.  See Pub. L. No. 100–430, §§ 5(b), 6(b)(1), 102 Stat. 1619, 1619–20, 1622 (1988). 
 88. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000), with 29 U.S.C. § 705(20) (2000). 
 89. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 420–21 & n.1 (2002); Beth Collins, The 
Americans with Disabilities Act: Rehabilitating Congressional Intent, 28 J. LEGIS. 213, 215 
(2002). 
 90. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (2000). 
 91. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (2000), with 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (2000). 
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substantial overlap between the reach of the two statutory texts, the ADA is 
focused on states, municipalities, and their various agencies, irrespective of 
whether they are recipients of federal financial assistance.92  Remedies under 
this provision are those available under § 504 which, in turn, borrows from 
those in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  As a consequence, plaintiffs 
bringing suit under the “public entities” provision of the ADA enjoy the 
“implied private right of action” recognized by the Supreme Court with respect 
to Title VI, Title IX, and § 504.93 
The “public accommodations” title (Title III) of the ADA94 can properly be 
viewed as a direct statutory descendant of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  Although significantly more detailed in the description and scope of 
“covered entities” than the 1964 provision, the ADA provision on public 
accommodation has been construed by the Supreme Court in light of the body 
of case law developed with respect to that earlier statute.95  Similarly, the 
remedial provisions of the 1990 Act were patterned after the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964: injunctive relief and attorney’s fees, but not compensatory damages, 
are available.96 
IV.  NEGATIVE FEEDBACK: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS CURTAILING THE 
REACH OF THE 1964 ACT AND ITS PROGENY 
The decision by Congress since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to borrow 
selectively from that statute in extending protection against other forms of 
discrimination has had generally positive consequences.  But one can see from 
a recent Supreme Court decision that this is not always the case.  There the 
question presented was whether punitive damages may be awarded in a private 
action brought pursuant to the “public entities” title of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.97  The Court answered that question in the negative, holding 
that because the remedies available under the ADA provisions are those under 
Title VI of the 1964 Act and because punitive damage are unavailable under 
Title VI, the result under the ADA had unavoidably to be the same.98  The 
Court added that § 504 remedies were similarly limited.99  However, as three 
Justices concurring in the judgment pointed out, the opinion of the Court treats 
the ADA, on the one hand, and Title VI, on the other, as amenable to identical 
legal interpretation, despite the fact that Title VI was enacted pursuant to 
 
 92. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (2000). 
 93. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002). 
 94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–89 (2000). 
 95. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 681 (2001). 
 96. See Ruth Colker, ADA Title III: A Fragile Compromise, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
377, 378 (2000). 
 97. Barnes, 536 U.S. at 183. 
 98. Id. at 189. 
 99. Id. 
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Congress’s Spending Power whereas the ADA was not.100  This case is a stark 
example, therefore, of how the “feedback” among the members of the family 
of modern civil rights laws can result in a curtailment rather than an expansion 
of remedies for illegal discrimination. 
A. Discontent Within the “Family” 
The view that expansion of civil rights protections initially granted by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ought to encompass other protected groups and 
prohibitions against discrimination has come under some rather intense, critical 
reassessment in recent years.  This has been caused, in large part, by the fact 
that the courts have proven significantly unreceptive to claims brought under 
the ADA, particularly with respect to employment.101  Disability rights 
advocates have, in addition to criticizing certain specific judicial rulings, raised 
the fundamental question of whether the drafters of the ADA should have 
looked to the “civil rights” model for inspiration and drawn upon the remedial 
and administrative schemes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.102  They argue 
that, because they did, courts have come to expect that the problems faced by 
persons with disabilities, and the required remedies and corrective measures 
for such problems, will closely parallel those that have historically been 
associated with racial and ethnic groups, as well as women.103  Although this 
expectation is justified in some respects, there are, nevertheless, fundamental 
differences between persons with disabilities that the ADA was enacted to 
address and those provided protection under earlier civil rights laws.  At the 
heart of the ADA are two terms that have found little expression in prior civil 
rights laws, namely, “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship.”104  
Although Title VII’s provision prohibiting employment discrimination on the 
basis of religion includes those terms,105 largely to avoid unnecessary tension 
 
 100. Id. at 192 (Stevens, J., concurring).  Because Title IX is also based upon Title VI, it is 
likely that punitive damages will be similarly barred there as well.  Farah S. Ahmed, Education 
Law Chapter: Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments, 5 GEO J. GENDER & L. 361, 373 
(2004). 
 101. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 99-100 (1999); Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under 
Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened?  Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP & LAB. L. 91, 160 (2000); Steny H. Hoyer, Not Exactly What We Intended, 
Justice O’Connor, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2002, at B1. 
 102. See Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 37–38 (2000); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA’s Revolving 
Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 340–41, 343, 362 
(2001). 
 103. Diller, supra note 102, at 32. 
 104. See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and 
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 6–7 (1996). 
 105. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000). 
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between the 1964 Act and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 
the Supreme Court has held that an employer’s compliance with that 
reasonable accommodation requirement entails nothing beyond the most 
modest, de minimus alteration of its ordinary practices.106  The ADA, in 
contrast, states that “reasonable accommodation” in the employment context 
may include making existing facilities accessible, job restructuring, 
“adjustment or modifications of examinations,” and “provision of qualified 
readers or interpreters.”107  Also, “undue hardship” is defined under the Act as 
“requiring significant difficulty or expense.”108  Both proponents and 
opponents acknowledge that these requirements go beyond the concept of 
“equal treatment” that has been at the core of the earlier civil rights statutes.109  
Some proponents contend, however, that there is a consistency, in fact and in 
theory, between what the ADA requires and the demands of the earlier “equal 
treatment” antidiscrimination regimes.110 For the ADA is designed to promote 
equality by providing otherwise qualified disabled people an equal chance to 
participate fully as producers in the American economic system.111 
A significant number of commentators, however, reject the assertion that 
the ADA is just another in a long line of antidiscrimination statutes.  Thus, 
they discern no overlap between Title VII and the employment provisions of 
the ADA.  Although sympathetic to the purposes and goals of the Act, they 
contend that it promises more than equality.112  Requirements that persons with 
disabilities be treated the “same as” and “different from” the non-disabled can 
both be found in provisions of the Act.113  It has been argued, in response, that 
the ADA, while not an antidiscrimination statute in the strict sense, is 
nevertheless consistent with an “antisubordination” theory animating 
constitutional equal protection doctrines and the more traditional civil rights 
statutes.114  More pointedly, some scholars have asserted that the Griggs 
disparate impact test itself is not based entirely on an antidiscrimination theory 
but rather on one that is “accommodationist” in many of the ways that the 
ADA demands. It requires an employer whose practices disproportionately 
disfavor members of certain groups to change those practices, even though 
 
 106. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84–85 (1977). 
 107. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000). 
 108. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2000). 
 109. See Diller, supra note 102, at 46–47; Karlan & Rurtherglen, supra note 104, at 40. 
 110. Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 645–46 
(2001). 
 111. H.R. REP. NO. 101–485(II), at 34 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 316. 
 112. See, e.g., Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 104, at 9–11. 
 113. See, e.g., id. at 8–9. 
 114. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 
(2000) (arguing that an antisubordination approach “accords with a powerful normative 
understanding of disability rights law and of civil rights law more generally”). 
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there is no evidence of an intent to discriminate.115  The ADA similarly 
requires that employers, even though they have not been found guilty of any 
intentional discrimination, to take special steps in response to the distinctive 
needs (measured against existing market structures) of disabled employees.  
Consequently, there is an overlap between certain features of so-called 
traditional civil rights laws and the ADA.116  Furthermore, if this general 
description of what has become an intense and complex scholarly debate were 
not complicated enough, the picture can be “complexified” further by adding 
just one more data point: Certain proponents of the view that the ADA is an 
antidiscrimination statute do not deny that its origins can also be traced to a 
history of social welfare legislation.  That history reflects a view that assistance 
to the disabled, particularly with respect to employment, will result in an 
economic gain to society as a whole.  Rather than being a drain on public 
resources, they would become contributors.117 
Beyond the legitimate intellectual concerns of the legal academy, however, 
one can understand how this debate may be animated also by a very practical 
set of concerns: the long-standing national battle over affirmative action.118  
Some proponents of the ADA suggest that a lack of judicial receptivity to the 
Act, especially with regard to employment, may stem from the fact that it is 
viewed as nothing more than a broad-scaled affirmative action measure.119  
Resistance to the notion that there is a close relationship between Title VII 
disparate impact theory and that underlying the ADA also raises profound 
concerns for defenders of the earlier antidiscrimination laws lest they, too, 
become more attractive targets for those opposed to affirmative action.120 
 
 115. Jolls, supra note 110, at 652–66. 
 116. Id. at 666–72. 
 117. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 921, 954 (2003); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 
YALE L.J. 1, 56 (2004); Diller, supra note 102, at 50.  For a helpful review of the existing 
literature on whether the ADA has produced positive results for people with disabilities in the 
employment sector, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Has the Americans with Disabilities Act Reduced 
Employment for People with Disabilities?, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP & LAB. L. 527 (2004) 
(reviewing, THE DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A POLICY PUZZLE 
(David C. Stapleton & Richard V. Burkhauser eds., 2003)). 
 118. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
244 (2003). 
 119. Diller, supra note 102, at 46–47. 
 120. See Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can 
Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. 
REV. 307, 314–15 (2001). 
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B. Federalism and Civil Rights 
Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has developed and deployed an 
expansive view of state sovereignty, the consequence of which has been to 
curtail severely the ability of Congress to legislate pursuant to powers granted 
it by both Article I and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution.121  Beginning with a nineteenth-century decision that construed 
the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution in ways that the text of that 
Amendment does not justify,122 the Court has now reached a point where it 
openly admits that its view of state sovereignty is untethered to the text of that 
Amendment altogether.123 
Additionally, the Court has held that Congress may not abrogate a state’s 
sovereign immunity and render it amenable to suit in damages pursuant to 
section 5 unless Congress has determined that a widespread violation of 
individual rights requires remediation and that the remedy chosen is 
“congruent and proportionate” to the nature of the violation.124  In these 
respects, the Court has evaluated the constitutionality of Congress’s 
identification of violation and remedy based upon the Court’s own tests for 
determining the constitutionality of state-imposed classifications.125  Applying 
this complex calculus, the Court has, thus far, held unconstitutional, among 
other laws, the ADEA’s provisions allowing damage actions against states126 
and a similar employment provision of the ADA.127  In each instance, the 
Court concluded that Congress had not adequately documented any “pattern of 
discrimination” by state agencies and improperly had made actionable conduct 
that would satisfy the “reasonableness” or “rational basis” standard of review 
under its “levels of scrutiny” equal protection jurisprudence.128 
Not until the past two terms did it become apparent that the Court was not 
going to strike down every attempt by Congress to abrogate state immunity to 
suits in damages under section 5.129  In one case, the Court upheld the family-
 
 121. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565–66 (1995) (restricting Congress’s power to 
regulate pursant to the commerce clause); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida., 517 U.S. 44 (1996) 
(restricting Congress’s power to regulate pursuant to the Indian commerce clause). 
 122. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 123. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 727–29 (1999). 
 124. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1997). 
 125. Drew S. Days, III, Race and the Constitution, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 101, 104–15 
(2000); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination 
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 525–26 (2000). 
 126. See Kimel v.  Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000). 
 127. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). 
 128. Id. at 372–74; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89–91. 
 129. The Court did not leave plaintiffs in Garrett without any recourse, however.  There, the 
Court recognized that ADA standards may be enforced against states by the United States for 
suits in damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief.  531 U.S. at 373 
n.9 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).  The United States has acted recently in 
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leave provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993130 on the 
grounds that Congress had legislated to protect the right of employees to be 
free from gender-based discrimination in the workplace.131  And, just last term, 
it upheld a provision in that title of the ADA prohibiting discrimination by 
“public entities” (Title II) on the basis of disability, but only “as it applies to 
the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts.”132  
The Court continues, however, to utilize the analytical framework that caused 
it to strike down the provisions having to do with employment discrimination 
based upon age and disability.  Consequently, predicting the outcome of the 
next challenge to section 5 legislation is truly a perilous exercise.133 
The decisions in Kimel, Garrett, Hibbs, and Lane raise a number of 
interesting and vexing questions, to be sure.  Three in particular, however, 
deserve attention because they offer possible future uses of the “feedback 
loop” thesis of this paper.  First, the Court has upheld Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act as a valid abrogation of state immunity to damage suits 
pursuant to Congress’s section 5 power.134  It has yet to rule, however, on 
whether the disparate impact doctrine of Griggs is similarly authorized by the 
Constitution.  It should be noted in this regard that in Garrett, the Court found 
particularly wanting, from a constitutional standpoint, the provision of the 
ADA that prohibits “‘utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of 
administration’ that disparately impact the disabled, without regard to whether 
such conduct has a rational basis.”135 
It can be argued, in this regard, that the Court should respond differently 
when faced with a situation where the disparate impact theory is utilized in 
cases of discrimination based upon race or sex, given that both categories are 
subject, unlike age and disability, to heightened constitutional scrutiny.  On the 
other hand, the Griggs test has been generally understood as one adopted by 
the Court originally to “smoke out” subtle cases of intentional discrimination 
and to “thaw” racially discriminatory employment practices that had 
 
reliance upon that principle in both ADA and ADEA cases.  See United States v. Miss. Dep’t of 
Pub. Safety, 321 F.3d 495, 497–98 (5th Cir. 2003) (ADA); EEOC v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. 
of Wis. Sys., 288 F.3d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 
(1999)) (ADEA). 
 130. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993). 
 131. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003). 
 132. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1994 (2004). 
 133. In his dissent in Tennessee v. Lane, Justice Scalia states he would circumscribe the use of 
the liberally applied “congruence and proportionality test” to congressional action targeted at 
racial discrimination, applying a more restrictive “enforcement test” in all other contexts.  Under 
this latter approach, federal regulation extending beyond mere enforcement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s proscriptions to prophylactic measures would exceed the constitutional authority 
granted under section 5.  See id. at 2009–10, 2013 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 134. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456–57 (1976). 
 135. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372 (2001). 
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historically “frozen” black workers, in particular, into traditionally segregated 
jobs.136  Whether those rationales could be defended, however, as of 1991 
when Congress codified the disparate impact test, is a more difficult matter. 
Second, in the principal dissent in Hibbs, Justice Kennedy argued 
essentially that the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993’s family-leave 
provision was not a proper exercise of Congress’s section 5 power to remedy 
discrimination on the basis of sex but rather just another entitlement 
program.137  This prompts the question of whether further consideration by the 
Court of the “public entities” provision of the ADA will revisit this same issue.  
In this respect, the ongoing scholarly debate over whether the ADA is really an 
antidiscrimination statute is likely to have important relevance for some 
members of the Court. 
Third, the Court’s federalism/state sovereign immunity decisions have all 
addressed Congress’s exercise of its section 5 power.  Congress has also 
invoked, however, its spending power as a basis for prohibiting certain forms 
of discrimination by recipients of federal financial assistance, most notably, in 
Title VI, Title IX, section 504, and the Age Discrimination Act.138  Because it 
is a truism that, without exception, states are recipients of large amounts of 
federal financial assistance, there is serious reason to wonder whether it would 
be constitutionally proper for Congress to use its spending power to prohibit 
those recipients from discriminating in employment on the basis of age and 
disability, thereby achieving by this means a result that the Court blocked 
under the ADEA and the ADA in Kimel and Garrett.139 
The plaintiffs in Garrett have, in fact, argued this point successfully in the 
lower courts on remand, invoking the remedial provisions of § 504.140  The 
ultimate success of this strategy, however, will turn on how the Court applies 
two lines of precedent.  The first is with respect to waiver of state sovereign 
immunity.141  The second involves the Tenth Amendment principle that 
Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds by states as 
 
 136. See generally Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 
and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972). 
 137. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 744–45 (2003) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
 138. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A 
Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. 
REV. 1197, 1198–2002 (2004). 
 139. See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should 
Abandon Its Spending Doctrine and How a Too-Clever Congress Should Provoke It To Do So, 78 
IND. L. J. 459, 503 (2003). 
 140. See generally  Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 344. F.3d 128 (11th 
Cir. 2003). 
 141. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 
691 (1999); Johathan Siegel, Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity and the Ideology of the 
Eleventh Amendment, 52 DUKE L.J. 1167 (2003). 
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long as the conditions are in pursuit of the general welfare, unambiguous, 
related to a federal interest, and not violative of other constitutional 
restrictions.142 
C. Limits on Government Agency Enforcement. 
Much of the discussion, thus far, has focused on the extent to which the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its progeny have explicitly granted, or have been 
construed to implicitly grant, private rights of action to remedy discriminatory 
practices.  But what Congress envisioned with respect to each of these 
statutory schemes was that there would be essentially a “public-private nexus” 
in which some combination of federal administrative action, suits by the 
Department of Justice or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and 
litigation initiated by private parties would make for a most effective 
combination of enforcement mechanisms.143  Put otherwise, the 1964 Act 
promoted the concept of the “private attorney general,”144 recognizing that the 
federal government would be unlikely to have the resources or, with changes in 
administration, sometimes the lack of political will to mount and maintain a 
sustained campaign against discrimination. 
Central to this arrangement was Congress’s assignment in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 to various administrative agencies145of responsibility for 
promulgating regulations that would serve to reduce the general language of 
the statutes to practical and operative terms for the guidance of all likely to be 
affected: other federal agencies, courts, employers, recipients of federal funds, 
places of public accommodation, and prospective plaintiffs.  This format was 
replicated by Congress in subsequent civil rights statutes.  The EEOC, for 
example, assumed major responsibility for promulgating procedural 
regulations pursuant to not only Title VII but also the employment provisions 
of the ADA.146 
In the case of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Title IX of the 
1972 Education Amendments, once the Supreme Court concluded that those 
provisions afforded an implied private right of action, it was widely assumed 
 
 142. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987). 
 143. After Sandoval, supra note 43, at 1774, 1776–78; see 42 U.S.C § 2000e-4 (2000) 
(addressing the EEOC). 
 144. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). 
 145. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 grants authority over Title VI to each agency or department 
that provides federal financial assistance.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000).  The EEOC was also 
created to help eliminate discrimination.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4.  The Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) was delegated authority over Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 by the Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844,  88 
Stat. 484, 612 (1974).  See Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828 (10th Cir. 
1993). 
 146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (2000) (Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2000) (ADA). 
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that agency regulations promulgated by the responsible agencies would 
similarly supply the basis for private rights of action.147  More specifically, this 
meant that not only administrative and Department of Justice enforcement but 
also private suits could be brought seeking remedies for disparate impact 
discrimination, as well as intentional discrimination.  In other words, the 
benefits that the Griggs doctrine afforded plaintiffs in Title VII litigation, such 
as not having to prove discriminatory intent, would become available to those 
suing under the several federal financial assistance provisions.148 
1. Alexander v. Sandoval 
This regime came to an end, however, in 2001 when the Supreme Court 
held in Alexander v. Sandoval that agency regulations interpreting Title VI to 
bar disparate impact discrimination by recipients of federal financial assistance 
did not create a private right of action.149  The Court based this conclusion on 
the fact that Title VI had been construed by a number of prior decisions to 
prohibit only intentional discrimination.150  Regulations, standing alone, could 
not authorize anything else.  Because Title IX and § 504 are in pari materia 
with Title VI, presumably, regulations under those statutes can no longer 
support private litigation alleging disparate impact discrimination either.151  
Indeed, the Court dropped strong hints, although it did not formally so hold, 
that the disparate impact regulations themselves may not be authorized by Title 
VI.152  What this would mean if the Court were to turn hint into reality is that 
neither administrative agency enforcement nor Department of Justice litigation 
based on Title VI, Title IX, and § 504 regulations would be able to rely upon a 
Griggs theory of discrimination.  In any event, the impact of Sandoval upon 
civil rights enforcement has been profound, much like what occurred after the 
1984 Grove City College decision narrowly defining “program or activity.”153 
This brings me to the second case mentioned at the outset of this article 
that has been accepted for Supreme Court review during the 2004-2005 Term.  
 
 147. See, e.g., New York Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 
1995); Roberts, 998 F.2d at 827–28; Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 
1406–07 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 148. See Mabry v. State Bd. of Cmty. Colls. and Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 317 n.6 
(10th Cir. 1987) (Title IX); N.M. Ass’n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847, 854 
(10th Cir. 1982) (Section 504). 
 149. 532 U.S. 275, 278 (2001). 
 150. Id. at 280–81. 
 151. See Weser v. Glen, 190 F. Supp. 2d 384, 395 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying disparate impact 
claim under Title IX regulations).  But see Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 
2002) (holding that Alexander v. Sandoval does not bar disparate impact claims under § 504 in 
view of the holding of Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 296–97, 299 (1985), that § 504 was 
intended by Congress to reach more than intentional discrimination). 
 152. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279, 281–82. 
 153. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text. 
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It has to do with whether there is a private right of action under Title IX for 
retaliation.  In this case, Mr. Jackson, a physical education teacher and girls 
basketball team coach, expressed to his superiors his belief that the girls team 
was being denied, in violation of Title IX, equal funding and equal access to 
sports facilities and equipment enjoyed by boys.154  Jackson claims that, 
thereafter, he received negative work evaluations and was ultimately relieved 
of his coaching duties, although he was retained as a tenured physical 
education teacher.  He subsequently filed suit against the school board seeking 
relief under Title IX for retaliation.  The dismissal of his suit by the trial court 
was affirmed on appeal.155 
The court of appeals held that Jackson had no private right of action under 
Title IX for retaliation based on a rather contorted reading of Sandoval.  The 
court said that although there is an implied private right of action for direct 
discrimination under Title IX, no holding of the Supreme Court exists for the 
proposition that Congress meant to provide for discrimination suits seeking 
remedies for retaliation under Title IX.156  It acknowledged that administrative 
regulations had long interpreted Title IX to provide a private cause of action 
for retaliation and had been successfully relied upon by private litigants for 
years to reach such claims.157  Nevertheless, the court of appeals invoked 
Sandoval for its stated proposition that administrative regulations cannot 
prohibit what the statute in question does not.  It noted that Sandoval was 
especially instructive because Title IX was patterned after Title VI.158 
On the face of it, it is hard to imagine that “discrimination” under Title IX 
does not include retaliation against one who is protesting against 
discrimination in education on the basis of sex.  This reading of Title IX 
requires no argument, clearly ruled out by Sandoval, that an implied cause of 
action for retaliation arises out of agency regulations.  It is based, instead, on 
the statute itself.159  Sandoval, in contrast, rejected a claim that regulations 
could create a cause of action for unintentional discriminatory conduct, despite 
the fact that the statute itself permits suits only for claims of intentional 
discrimination.160  As a practical matter, leaving unprotected those who protest 
against such conduct is likely to increase the vulnerability of the direct 
 
 154. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 2002) rev’d, 125 S. 
Ct. 1497 (2005).  The Court’s decision embraced a rationale like that set out infra notes 159–60. 
 155. Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1347–48. 
 156. Id. at 1343, 1347–48. 
 157. Id. at 1346 n.13. 
 158. Id. at 1344–46. 
 159. Another court recently held that retaliation was covered under Title VI even though it 
makes no explicit reference in that regard.  Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 318–19 (4th Cir. 
2003). 
 160. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–88, 292 (2001). 
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beneficiaries of Title IX’s provisions, like the members of Mr. Jackson’s girls 
basketball team. 
A case accepted for review by the Supreme Court, however, is hardly ever 
a straightforward proposition.  At least two considerations point against the 
Court’s ruling in Mr. Jackson’s favor.  First, Title VII of the 1964 Act contains 
an explicit prohibition against retaliation.161  This was pointed to by the court 
of appeals and by Jackson’s opponents as evidence that when Congress wishes 
to prohibit retaliation it knows how to do so explicitly.162  That retaliation is 
expressly prohibited also by the ADEA and the ADA reinforces this 
argument.163 
Implying a private right of action for retaliation, it is argued, would not be 
consistent with what Congress intended but would be the precise opposite.  
Second, even if the Court concludes that an implied private right of action for 
retaliation does exist, it may find, nevertheless (as did the court of appeals), 
that Mr. Jackson was not “within the class meant to be protected by Title IX” 
in this regard.164  What the court of appeals envisioned is, at most, an implied 
private cause of action for retaliation only for “direct victims” of sex 
discrimination—here, the members of the girls basketball team.  If they had 
complained about being denied equal treatment and had been retaliated against 
(in effect, doubly discriminated against) for not accepting that mistreatment in 
silence, presumably, their standing would be incontrovertible.165  Although this 
may seem curious, the Supreme Court has made clear that, because the implied 
private right of action under Title IX is a  judicially created one, it has rather 
broad latitude to shape “a sensible remedial scheme that best comports with the 
statute.”166  Here the “feedback loop” may occur once more; however the 
Court resolves the Jackson case, its decision and its impact will likely also be 
felt in litigation brought under Title VI and the Age Discrimination Act.167 
2. Sandoval and Congress 
Since enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, where the Supreme Court 
has construed provisions of that and subsequent enactments in ways tending to 
curtail effective enforcement against acts of discrimination, Congress has, as 
discussed earlier, responded with countering legislation.  Such has been 
congressional reaction to the Sandoval decision.  In February of 2004, 
 
 161. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). 
 162. Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1345 n.12. 
 163. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2000) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C.§ 12203(a) (2000) (ADA). 
 164. Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1346. 
 165. Id. at 1346–47. 
 166. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 284 (1998). 
 167. Congress amended § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to import the ADA standard 
for establishing a violation which includes an express retaliation provision.  See Rehabilitation 
Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, § 506, 106 Stat. 4344, 4428 (1992). 
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proposed legislation, the Fairness and Individual Rights Necessary to Ensure a 
Stronger Society: Civil Rights Act of 2004, was introduced in both Houses of 
Congress by Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts and Representatives 
John Conyers of Michigan, John Lewis of Georgia, and George Miller of 
California.168  Insofar as Sandoval is concerned, the bill is designed to confirm 
“that individuals may obtain relief under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, . . .Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, . . . and the Age 
Discrimination Act of 1975 from practices in federally funded programs that 
have an unjustified discriminatory effect.”169 The legislation, in other words, 
codifies the Griggs test.  The bill’s findings are that the “effectiveness [of 
those statutes] . . . depends on the right of private enforcement, including the 
private right to enforce protections against practices having an unjustified 
discriminatory effect.”170  Consequently, after forty years of “feedback loop” 
developments, both positive and negative, the “conversation” between the 
Supreme Court and Congress continues unabated. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
If history is any guide, Congress may get its way, sooner or later, and enact 
the Fairness Act to reverse the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sandoval and 
several other cases171 viewed as unduly restricting the reach of civil rights 
laws.  The “feedback loop” that I have described here is likely to continue, as 
well. 
It is clear, however, that the central story of the forty years since the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 was enacted is very much one of the consistency and 
constancy of the United States Congress, acting in a bipartisan fashion to 
ensure that the civil rights laws of the United States continue to extend their 
 
 168. Fairness and Individual Rights Necessary to Ensure a Stronger Society: Civil Rights Act 
of 2004, H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. (2004); Dina Lassow, In Support of a New Civil Rights Act, 
HUM. RTS., Summer 2004, at 22. 
 169. Fact Sheet: The Fairness Act, at http://www.house.gov/johnlewis/pdf/040211_ 
FactSheet2-5-04.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005). 
 170. Fairness and Individual Rights Necessary to Ensure a Stronger Society: The Civil Rights 
Act of 2004 (“The Fairness Act”), at http://www.house.gov/johnlewis/pdf/040211.Sectionby 
Section01_26_04.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (section-by-section summary of the bill). 
 171. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189–90 (2002) (barring punitive damages for 
intentional violations of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); Buckhannon Bd. & Care 
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001) (limiting the 
abilities of victims of unlawful treatment to recover attorney’s fees in certain civil rights cases); 
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109, 111-12, 123 (2001) (holding that 
employers may require workers to arbitrate employment discrimination and unfair labor disputes 
to gain employment); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (barring claims for 
damages against states under the ADEA); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 
292 (1998) (limiting remedies for students’ sexual harassment claims). 
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protections, both procedurally and substantively, in the cause of greater 
opportunity and promise for all Americans. 
Of this legacy, the members of the 88th Congress deserve to be very proud, 
indeed. 
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